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…vigilance shall be maintained by each person 
operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid 
other aircraft…pilot shall give way to that 
aircraft and may not pass over, under, or 
ahead of it unless well clear.
14CFR Part 91, 91.113
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Analysis Overview
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• Analysis 1: Characterizing encounters at well clear boundaries. 
– Objective:
• Investigate implications of using Well Clear Definitions proposed from the UAS 
community in terms of surveillance requirements and safety.
– Metrics:
• Rate of Losses of Well Clear per UAS Flight Hour
• Relative State information at the Loss of Well Clear (LoWC)
• Analysis 2: Evaluating the alerting criteria. 
– Objective:
• Investigate implications of an alerting scheme as suggested from the UAS 
community in terms of surveillance requirements and safety.
– Metrics:
• Rate of Alerts per Flight Hour
• Percentage of Nuisance Alerts
• Relative State Information at First Alert
• Time to Loss of Well Clear
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Unmitigated Encounter Rate Evaluation
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Loss of Well Clear
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Alerting Criteria
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UAS Missions Overview
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Simulation Configuration
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• There are 24 different simulation runs 
– 1 simulation run is a single day in the US national airspace system (NAS)
• Each simulation had
– UAS: 9 Different Proposed Missions
• Total of 18,000 UAS flights in data set (~26,000 flight hours)
• Variety of aircraft performance, mission profiles, geographic areas of operation
– Traffic: Cooperative VFR Traffic (secondary radar returns)
• Derived from 84th squadron air defense radar data
• Varying volume of traffic (20-28k flights)
• Days are spread over 4 seasons in 2012 (24 days total)
– No Separation mitigation 
• Metrics only collected for UAS vs. VFR conflicts
• No Detect and Avoid System was present
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Relative Heading and Distance at LoWC
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Analysis 2: Evaluating the Alerting Criteria
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Rate of Self Separation Alerts
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Percentage of Nuisance Alerts
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Relative Heading and Distance at First 
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Conclusions and Recommendations
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• Surveillance and Alerting Guidelines:
– DAA system would want a surveillance range of 4-5 nmi
– Using the proposed alerting criteria the surveillance range would nominally 
need to be 10 nmi to alert the UAS operator to take action
– There is a trade-off between time to loss of well clear and percentage of 
nuisance alerts
• The larger the alerting volume   è More time before loss of well clear and larger 
percentage of nuisance alerts.
• Recommendations: 
– Consider buffers for alerting criteria
– Include ownship intent in alerting criteria
– Consider multiple layers of alerting
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